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Abstract
We examine the corporate governance roles of information quality and the takeover
market with asymmetric information regarding the value of the target firm. Increasing information quality improves the takeover efficiency, however, a highly efficient
takeover market also discourages the manager from exerting effort. We find that perfect
information quality is not optimal for either the current shareholders’ expected payoff maximization or the expected firm value maximization. Furthermore, the current
shareholders prefer a lower level of information quality than the level that maximizes
the expected firm value, because of a misalignment between the current shareholders’
welfare and the total firm value. We also analyze the impact of antitakeover laws, and
we find that the passage of antitakeover laws may induce the current shareholders to
choose a higher level of information quality and thus increase the expected firm value.
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Introduction

Financial accounting information provides direct input in the design of corporate governance mechanisms (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). Most
theoretical studies on the role of accounting information in corporate governance have concentrated on executive compensation and performance measures in agency-based models,1
while the role of accounting information with respect to other corporate governance mechanisms remains underexplored. In this paper, we provide a theoretical model to examine the
governance roles of information quality and an important external governance mechanism
—the corporate takeover market.
Recently, the role of financial reporting in facilitating takeover markets has gained attention from empirical researchers. For example, several empirical studies have examined
whether the information quality of financial reporting influences the profitability and efficiency of acquisitions (Francis and Martin, 2010; Ramen, Shivakumar, and Tamayo, 2013;
McNichols and Stubben, 2015). In general, these studies focus on the perspective of acquirers and find that higher quality accounting information reduces the information asymmetry
between the target and the acquirer, and allows the acquirer to better evaluate the target
and bid more efficiently. However, it is unclear whether target firms have an incentive to increase information quality to improve takeover efficiency for the acquirers. Moreover, despite
the growing interest of empirical studies in this area, no theoretical models have examined
the role of financial information in takeovers. Our study is among the first to provide an
analytical analysis to better understand the interaction between the information quality of
financial reports and the takeover market as corporate governance mechanisms.
In our model, the takeover market serves two important functions. First, the takeover
creates synergy values that improve shareholders’ welfare. Prior studies have shown that
such synergies may come from improved operating efficiency, reduced capital investment,
tax benefits or market power (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Hayn, 1989; Kim and Singal,
1993; Devos, Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, 2009).2 Second, the incumbent manager loses
his private benefit of control after a successful takeover, which is more likely to occur if the
manager shirks.3 Hence, the takeover market also serves as an incentive device to motivate
1

Bushman and Smith (2001) and Armstrong et al. (2010) both provide detailed reviews of this literature.
For example, in the recent acquisition of Tim Hortons by Burger King backed by Berkshire Hathaway, analysts and investors expect that the acquisition will create synergies through market expansion opportunities
and tax savings.
3
Previous studies such as Martin and McConnell (1991), and Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (2004) document
a significant CEO turnover during takeovers, and also find a negative relation between the pre-takeover
performance and post-takeover CEO turnovers. Even if a CEO remains in place, he/she may lose the power
2
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the incumbent manager. However, an efficient takeover market may have a negative effect
on the manager’s effort incentive if a high-value firm could also be taken over.
Information asymmetry exists in the takeover bidding: the acquirer observes a noisy
accounting signal regarding the target firm value, while the target shareholders observe
the true firm value. The acquirer chooses her optimal bidding strategy contingent on the
observed signal, and the bidding strategy is affected by the informativeness of the signal.
The current shareholders choose the information quality level to maximize their own payoff,
including both the current firm value and potential premiums from the takeover.4
Increasing information quality has two primary effects. On the one hand, more precise
accounting signals reduce the information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target
shareholders. As a result, the acquirer, less concerned about the overbidding loss, is willing
to bid more aggressively, increasing the likelihood of takeover success. On the other hand,
the manager, knowing that his private benefit is more likely to be deprived by a more
efficient takeover market, is less motivated to exert effort in the first place. The tradeoff of
aforementioned two primary effects determines the optimal information quality level. We
find that a perfectly informative information system is not optimal for either the the current
shareholders’ expected payoff or the expected firm value maximization, mainly because of
the negative effect of higher information quality on the manager’s effort.
We also find that the current shareholders’ choice of information quality is different from
the information quality level that maximizes the expected firm value, because the current
shareholders’ welfare and the expected firm value are not fully aligned. The expected firm
value consists of two parts: the expected firm value without takeover and the expected
synergy value from the takeover. For the current shareholders, their expected payoff is
different from the expected firm value because they only obtain a portion of the synergy
value from takeover; furthermore, they obtain an overbidding premium when the firm value
is low but the acquirer offers a high price. We find that the current shareholders overall
prefer a lower information quality level than that needed to maximize the firm value, mainly
because the current shareholders do not enjoy the full synergy value from the takeover.
Our results highlight the difference between current shareholders’ welfare and the firm value
of making decisions or cannot enjoy the same private benefit as before after the acquirer takes control.
4
The “information quality” in our paper can be interpreted as the informativeness of financial reporting
or the quality of the information system. A system with higher information quality provides more accurate
signals about firm values and facilitates valuations by investors. As suggested by Armstrong et al. (2010),
the board of directors can affect the firm’s information environment through (or compel the manager to
commit to) several mechanisms, including a commitment to timely financial information, hiring a high-quality
auditor and establishing an independent audit committee, inviting financial experts as outside directors, and
maintaining or encouraging more active investors as monitors.
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that represents the welfare of all shareholders—current and future. This difference is often
overlooked by regulators and academics.
In addition, we study the impact of antitakeover laws on firms’ endogenous information
quality as well as on the current shareholders’ welfare and the firm value. Antitakeover
laws have been controversial in regards to regulating the takeover market. Researchers and
practitioners have debated for years whether antitakeover laws improve or reduce shareholders’ wealth (Straska and Waller, 2014). One element missing from previous studies is the
endogenous choice of information quality. Our study shows that current shareholders may
increase the information quality to maximize their expected payoff in response to the passage of antitakeover laws. With a higher information quality, the expected firm value also
increases after the passage of antitakeover laws. This result provides interesting implications
that differ from conventional wisdom on the impact of antitakeover laws on firms’ welfare.
Proponents of antitakeover laws usually argue that the laws protect firms from detrimental
hostile takeovers. However, in our model, takeovers can only enhance firm value and we still
find anti-takeover laws may increase the expected firm value. Our theoretical prediction is
also consistent with the empirical evidence (Armstrong et al., 2012) that financial reporting
quality improves after the passage of antitakeover laws. Armstrong et al. (2012) interpret
their finding as evidence of less private-information gathering in the equity market after
the passage of antitakeover laws. Our theory provides an alternative explanation from the
perspective of direct effects of information on takeover activities.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide a review of the
related literature. In Section 3 we present the main model setup and analyze the acquirer’s
bidding strategy. We then examine the equilibria and analyze the optimal informationquality levels that maximize the current shareholders’ expected payoff and the expected
firm value, respectively. In Section 4, we examine the impact of antitakeover laws. Section
5 examines two extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes and discusses the empirical
implications of our results. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2

Related Literature

Our paper fits in a broad literature that examines the “decision-usefulness” of accounting
information. Along this line, a large strand of existing studies focus on exchange economy
settings in which firm value is exogenously given and invariant to the accounting reporting
system (for example, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007). In contrast, in our paper the
firm value is affected by current shareholders’ information choice, and at the same time, the
3

current shareholders’ own constraints prevent them from choosing the optimal decision for
firm value. Studies about the production effect of accounting information either use standard
agency models (for example, Gigler and Hemmer, 2001; Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang, 2007) or
real-effect models (for example, Kanodia and Lee, 1998). Our paper differs from these two
approaches because, first, in contrast to typical agency models, the interest of the principal
(the current shareholders) is not fully aligned with the firm value maximization in our model,
and the manager is not the only pundit in the economy; second, in real-effect models, the
information users only indirectly affect firm value through market pricing, while in our model
the information users directly affect firm value by their merger and acquisition decisions.
Our result of the imperfect optimal-information precision echoes other studies with similar conclusions in different settings. For example, Kanodia, Singh, and Spero (2005) show
that some degree of accounting imprecision can be value-enhancing in a setting with information asymmetry regarding investment profitabilities. Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998) show
that noisy signals (allowing earnings management by opportunistic managers) may be beneficial to owners who lack commitment. Arya and Mittendorf (2011) find that more detailed
information may not always be beneficial in evaluating managers’ performance given career
concerns. Arya, Glover, and Sivaramakrishnan (1997) study a budget center’s information
precision decision as a commitment device, and show that a coarser-than-necessary information system can maximize its expected profit. Fan and Zhang (2012) show that, when a firm
can control the quality of accounting information with some cost, optimal accounting policies
aggregate underlying information and have a conservative bias. Bertomeu, Beyer, and Dye
(2011) examine the interaction between a firm’s disclosure policy and its capital structure
and find that more expansive voluntary disclosure does not lead to a lower cost of capital.
Our study contributes to this literature by examining the endogenous information quality
in a corporate governance setting through the takeover market, as well as by analyzing the
interaction of accounting information quality and governance mechanisms.
We also contribute to the studies on antitakeover laws and provisions. For example,
DeAngelo and Rice (1983) test several explanations for antitakeover amendments and find
weak support for the hypothesis that antitakeover laws benefits incumbent management.
Comment and Schwert (1995) study the effect of antitakeover policies from 1975 to 1991 and
find that antitakeover measures such as poison pill rights, control share laws, and business
combination laws did not systematically deter takeovers. They also find that poison pills and
control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders. A recent study by Heron and Lie (2015) also finds similar evidence by examining
the outcomes of unsolicited takeover attempts from 1985 to 2009. They find that poison pills

4

lead to increased takeover premiums, but do not reduce takeover completion rates. Cremers
and Ferrell (2014) find that after the Delaware Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 1985,
which judicially validated the adoption of a poison pill, the increase in shareholder rights
is significantly associated with higher firm values. Although numerous empirical research
studies antitakeover laws, the consequences of antitakeover laws remain an underexplored
area in analytical research, and our study is among the first to provide theoretical insight
on this topic.
Our paper is also related to the broad literature on the role of various corporate control
mechanisms in the presence of information asymmetry among different parties. Langberg,
Kumar, and Sivaramakrishnan (2012) study managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions when
an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. Baldenius,
Melumad, and Meng (2014) examine the endogenous information environment and board
composition, and the effects on CEO bias and investment efficiency. Caskey, Nagar, and
Petacchi (2010) examine the role of an independent audit committee that attempts to remove the bias in a manager’s reports, but may introduce its own bias into the reporting.
Laux (2008) and Drymiotes (2007) analyze the effect of board independence and show that
less independent boards can be more efficient. Laux and Laux (2009) examine the board
of directors’ strategies for setting CEO incentive pay and overseeing financial reporting and
the effects on the level of earnings management. Our study adds to this literature by examining the disciplinary role of the takeover market in the presence of information uncertainty
regarding the target.

3

The Main Model

3.1

Model Setup

We consider a two-period model with dates t = 0, 1, and 2. At date 0, the current shareholders choose the quality of the financial reporting system, d ∈ [ 12 , 1]. The quality represents
the precision of the noisy signal generated by the financial reporting system, which we will
elaborate soon. After d is determined, an incumbent manager makes an effort e that affects
the firm’s future value v. The firm value is binary, v ∈ {0, 1}.5 For convenience, we refer to
the manager as “he.” The manager’s effort is not observable. For simplicity, we assume that
5

The binary outcome assumption simplifies the model and allows us to perform a more comparative
statics analysis of our results. We have also examined a continuous-outcome setting and find that, though
no closed-form solutions can be obtained due to the complexity of the payoff function, the main effects in
the binary setting still exist in the continuous setting. The analysis is available upon request.

5

e ∈ [0, 1]. The cost of the manager’s effort is a convex function, 12 e2 . If the manager shirks,
the expected value of the firm will be lower. Specifically, we assume that the probability of
generating a high firm value (v = 1) is e (i.e., prob(v = 1|e) = e), and the probability of a
low firm value (v = 0) is 1 − e (i.e., prob(v = 0|e) = 1 − e).
At date 1, the firm value v is privately observed by the current shareholders. Outsiders
do not observe the firm value, but receive a noisy public signal y about the firm value, which
can be interpreted as a signal generated from the financial reporting system.6 The signal is
binary, y ∈ {G, B}, where G represents a good signal and B represents a bad signal. The
information quality of the financial reporting system determines the information properties
of the signal. We assume that:
prob(y = G|v = 1) = prob(y = B|v = 0) = d,

(1)

prob(y = B|v = 1) = prob(y = G|v = 0) = 1 − d.
That is, a higher quality information system produces a more informative signal.
At date 2, a potential acquirer makes an offer p to the current shareholders. For convenience, we use “she” to refer to the acquirer. The takeover creates a synergy value of v0 ,
0 < v0 < 1, and v0 is common knowledge and independent of the current firm value v.7 The
synergy value may come from improved operating efficiency, reduced capital investment, tax
benefit, or market power (Bradley et al., 1988; Hayn, 1989; Kim and Singal, 1993; Fee and
Thomas, 2004; Devos et al., 2009, etc.). If the takeover succeeds, the new firm value becomes
v + v0 . If the takeover fails, the firm value remains to be v.
The synergy value v0 is commonly known, and we assume that the acquirer and the
current shareholders split the synergy value. Specifically, we assume that the acquirer is
able to obtain γ share of synergy value after takeover, and the current shareholders obtain
6

We assume that the current shareholders obtain the perfect information about firm value for simplicity.
A variation of our model could assume that shareholders observe a noisy signal about firm value, but the
acquirer receives a less precise signal than what shareholders observe. Our main results are robust to this
variation.
7
In our model, we assume that the synergy value from takeover is independent of the target firm value.
This assumption can be relaxed to allow asymmetric synergy values in high- and low-value firms (i.e., v0
depends on v). For instance, it is possible that the acquirer is able to improve the firm value more in a
badly managed firm than in a well managed firm. Our results remain robust as long as the synergy value
through takeover does not overwhelm the prior firm value generated by management effort (i.e., v0 < 1). If
the synergy value is so large that it is greater than the maximum firm value through management effort, the
impact of effort becomes negligible and only takeover efficiency matters, at which point perfect information
quality is desirable; however, the case of a very huge synergy value is unrealistic and extreme. A detailed
analysis is available upon request.
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t=0
The current
shareholders
choose d.

The manager
chooses e.

t=1

t=2

Firm value v
is privately observed.
Signal y
is publicly observed.

The acquirer
offers p.
Shareholders tender,
takeover succeeds
or fails.

Figure 1: Timeline.
1 − γ share of synergy value.8
The manager enjoys a private benefit m if the firm is not taken over. If the takeover
succeeds, the incumbent manager is deprived of his private benefit. That is, in our main
model, the manager is motivated to exert effort purely through the private benefit of control.9
It is reasonable to assume that the manager’s private benefit is smaller than the synergy value
from the takeover; i.e., 0 < m < v0 . By this assumption, we focus on takeover activities
that are socially beneficial; otherwise, if m > v0 , it would be questionable whether takeover
is socially optimal.
The acquirer makes the bidding offer based on her belief about the target value. If the
current shareholders accept the offer, the takeover is successful; otherwise, the takeover fails.
Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of our model.
8

γ can be interpreted as the relative bargaining power over the synergy value created by the acquisition. A
merger/acquisition agreement is often the result of negotiations between the acquirer and target shareholders
(Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008; Aktas, Bodt, and Roll, 2010). In our model we assume the synergy
value is commonly known, and therefore bargaining over the synergy value is not affected by the information
asymmetry over the target firm’s current value. Synergy values usually come from increased sales, improved
production efficiency, combined talent and technology, or cost reduction, and so forth, and the synergy gains
are not necessarily contingent on the information asymmetry about the current firm value of the target.
Bargaining over these synergy gains usually depends on which party is more critical in deriving these gains.
For example, Ahern (2012) shows that the split of gains in a merger depends on the market power (or target
scarcity) and the product market dependence (customer-supplier relationship) between the target and the
acquirer. Therefore, in our model, we implicitly assume that the share of synergy value (γ) between the
acquirer and the target firm are determined by exogenous factors that are independent of the information
asymmetry about the target firm’s current value.
9
In the main setting, we assume that m is the manager’s only benefit that compensates for his effort, as
we want to concentrate on the disciplinary role of the takeover market instead of other incentive mechanisms.
In Section 5 we show that our main results are robust when we introduce a performance-based compensation
contract.

7

3.2

Acquirer’s Bidding with Information Asymmetry

In our model, the acquirer faces information asymmetry regarding the target’s current fundamental value v. The current shareholders observe the true value before the acquirer makes
the bidding offer. It is easy to see that the shareholders of a low-value firm will accept any
offer no less than pl ≡ (1 − γ)v0 , and the shareholders of a high-value firm will accept any
offer no less than ph ≡ 1 + (1 − γ)v0 . The acquirer’s payoff from the takeover, if successful,
is v + v0 − p. We denote the acquirer’s belief about the firm value being high given her conjecture about the managerial effort level and the signal to be ĥ, and the acquirer’s expected
payoff Πr is therefore given by
Πr (p, ĥ) = E[v|v + (1 − γ)v0 ≤ p] + v0 − p,

(2)

with P r(v = 1) = ĥ, P r(v = 0) = 1 − ĥ.
With the firm’s value v being binary (either 0 or 1), the acquirer will optimally offer either
pl , or ph . Any other price is dominated.10
When the acquirer offers the high price ph , both the high- and low-value firms’ shareholders will accept the offer. In this case, the acquirer potentially suffers an overbidding loss if
the acquired firm is a low-value firm, but the takeover always succeeds such that the acquirer
always obtains the share of synergy value. When the acquirer offers pl , only the low-value
firms’ shareholders will accept the offer. In this case, the acquirer does not overbid, but she
cannot obtain the synergy value from acquiring a high-value firm. To maximize her expected
payoff, the acquirer needs to consider the trade-off between the share of synergy value from
taking over a high-value firm and the expected overbidding loss from taking over a low-value
firm. The acquirer will offer ph only when her belief about high firm value is sufficiently
high to avoid a potential overbidding loss; otherwise, the acquirer offers pl , or is indifferent
between offering pl and ph .
If there were no accounting signals, the acquirer’s belief would simply be her prior based
on the conjectured effort level ĥ = ê. If her prior is high, she would bid ph ; if it is low, she
1
, she would be indifferent between bidding ph
would bid pl ; if her prior is at ĥ = ê = 1+γv
0
and pl . For our convenience, from now on we refer the acquirer’s bidding strategy given no
10

The reason is as follows. First, in order to induce the high-value-firm shareholders to tender, the
acquirer only needs to offer exactly 1 + (1 − γ)v0 . Any price above 1 + (1 − γ)v0 is not optimal for the
acquirer, as it merely increases the takeover cost while yielding the same takeover outcome. In addition, the
acquirer would not offer any price between ph and pl . To see this, suppose the acquirer offers a price p0 and
(1 − γ)v0 < p0 < 1 + (1 − γ)v0 ; in this scenario, only the low-value firms’ shareholders accept p0 . However, the
acquirer can be better off by reducing the offer price to (1 − γ)v0 , which yields the same takeover outcome
(i.e., successful takeover of a low-value firm) without an additional overbidding premium.
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signal to be her default bidding strategy.
Lemma 1 The acquirer’s default bidding strategy without accounting signals is: bidding ph
1
1
1
for ê > 1+γv
; bidding pl for ê < 1+γv
; and indifferent between ph and pl for ê = 1+γv
.
0
0
0
With the accounting signals, the acquirer’s strategy is now based on the updated belief
after observing the signal, ĥ(y) ≡ P rob(v = 1|ê, y). Given the information structure in (1),
we have:
êd
,
êd + (1 − d)(1 − ê)
ê(1 − d)
ĥ(B) =
.
ê(1 − d) + (1 − ê)d

ĥ(G) =

(3)

To facilitate our discussion, we define αG and αB as the probability of offering a high price
upon a good signal and a bad signal, respectively ( i.e., αG = P r(ph |G) and αB = P r(ph |B)).
We have the following results.
Lemma 2 The acquirer’s bidding strategy with accounting signals is as follows:
• When the information quality d is low ( 21 ≤ d <
default bidding strategy.

1−ê
),
1−ê(1−γv0 )

the acquirer sticks to her

1−ê
≤ d ≤ 1), the acquirer revises her
• When the information quality is high ( 1−ê(1−γv
0)
bidding strategy in the following way:

- If ê >

1
,
1+γv0

then αG = 1, and αB = 0 or 0 < αB < 1.

- If ê <

1
,
1+γv0

then αG = 1 or 0 < αG < 1, and αB = 0.

- If ê =

1
,
1+γv0

then αG = 1 and αB = 0.

The results highlight the role of information quality in determining the acquirer’s bidding
strategy. When the signal is consistent with the prior, it is optimal for the acquirer to go
with the prior and follow her default bidding strategy. When the signal contradicts the prior,
it is optimal for the acquirer to go with the signal only when the information quality of the
signal is sufficiently high. For example, when the prior is optimistic (ê is high), the acquirer’s
default strategy is to bid the high price. In this case, a contradicting bad signal can change
the acquirer’s default decision only if the signal is very precise. Similar intuition applies to
the case when the prior is pessimistic (ê is low).

9

3.3

Equilibrium Analysis

We first characterize the manager’s equilibrium effort and the acquirer’s equilibrium bidding
strategy, taking as given the information quality d. We will later examine the optimal
choices of information quality for the current shareholders and the firm value maximization,
respectively.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the manager’s effort and the acquirer’s bidding strategy,
given the information quality, is defined as follows.
∗
∗
Definition 1 A set of strategies (e∗ , αG
, αB
) forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that:

(1). The acquirer forms her belief about the manager’s effort ê, and her optimal bidding
∗
∗
(ê)) satisfies the bidding strategies specified in Lemma 2.
(ê), αB
strategy (αG
(2). The manager’s optimal effort e∗ maximizes his own expected payoff, given the antici∗
∗
pated optimal bidding strategy of the acquirer (αG
(ê), αB
(ê)).
(3). The acquirer’s belief is consistent with the manager’s optimal effort, ê = e∗ .
For any bidding strategy, a takeover fails when the acquirer offers a low price and the true
value of the firm is high. Given the manager’s effort e, the probability of takeover success,
P rob[T ], is
P rob[T ] = 1 − e + e[dαG + (1 − d)αB ].
(4)
The manager’s expected payoff for choosing an effort level of e given the acquirer’s bidding
strategy, Πm (e, αG , αB ), is thus given by:
e2
e2
= e · (1 − [dαG + (1 − d)αB ])m − .
(5)
2
2
Given the acquirer’s strategy, the manager’s optimal effort that maximizes his expected
payoff is
e∗ (αG , αB ) = m − [dαG + (1 − d)αB ]m.
(6)
Πm (e, α, β) = (1 − P rob[T ])m −

The takeover market affects the manager’s effort incentive in two ways. First, it disciplines
the manager to make effort since a low-value firm is always taken over, as represented by the
first term in (6). The manager is motivated to exert effort to reduce the probability of low
firm value, and this reduces the takeover probability directly. Second, the takeover threat
discourages the manager’s effort when a high-value firm may also be taken over. This negative
effect of the takeover market is represented by the second term, −[dαG + (1 − d)αB ]m, in (6).
10

Notice that this negative effect is aggravated when the information quality d increases or
when the acquirer’s bidding becomes more aggressive with a higher αG or αB . This is because
both higher information quality and aggressive bidding increase the chance of a successful
takeover for the high-value firm and thus further discourages the managerial effort.
We find that not all bidding strategies in Lemma 2 are sustainable in equilibrium, because
the acquirer’s conjecture of the manager’s effort must be consistent with the manager’s
optimal choice of effort. Our analysis shows that, in equilibrium, aggressive bidding strategies
are not sustainable. In particular, we find that the acquirer will not bid the high price with
∗
certainty upon a good signal (0 < αG
< 1). This is because if she always bids the high price
upon a good signal, the chance that a high-value firm is taken over becomes high, which
significantly discourages the manager’s effort. As a result, the expected firm value will be
low, which cannot support the acquirer’s belief of a high ê to always bid the high price
upon a good signal. Moreover, in equilibrium, the acquirer always bids a low price upon a
∗
= 0. This is because the acquirer is willing to bid a high price upon a bad
bad signal, αB
signal only when the conjectured effort is high and the information quality is low (Lemma
∗
> 0) again discourages the manager’s effort, and cannot be
2). The aggressive bidding (αB
sustainable in equilibrium.
We list the three sustainable equilibria given the information quality d and the manager’s
private benefit level m as follows:
• (separating-price-bidding equilibrium) When d = 1, the manager chooses e∗ = 0,
∗
∗
= 0;11
= 1 and αB
and the acquirer chooses αG
1
• (mixed-price-bidding equilibrium) When m > 1+γv
and 12 ≤ d < 1, or m ≤
0
1−d
1
1−m
, the manager chooses e∗ = 1−d(1−γv
, and the acquirer
and 1 > d > 1−m+γv
1+γv0
0m
0)
∗
=
chooses αG

1 γv0 dm−(1−d)(1−m)
d (1−d)m+γv0 dm

∗
and αB
= 0;

1
• (low-price-bidding equilibrium) When m ≤ 1+γv
and 12 ≤ d ≤
0
∗
∗
manager chooses e∗ = m, and the acquirer chooses αG
= αB
= 0.

1−m
,
1−m+γv0 m

the

The conditions for these three different equilibria are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Given the sustainable equilibria, we summarize the comparative statics analysis about
how the information quality affects the equilibrium effort and bidding strategy as follows.
∗
Notice that even though αG
= 1 appears in the separating-price-bidding equilibrium when d = 1,
we will never observe a good signal in that equilibrium, because the manager’s effort incentive is completely
eliminated and thus the firm value is always low, which will always result in a bad signal by the perfect
information system.
11

11

Proposition 1 The equilibrium manager effort (e∗ ) is weakly decreasing in the information
∗
quality, and the probability of bidding a high price upon a good signal (αG
) in equilibrium is
weakly increasing in the information quality; i.e.,
∂e∗
≤ 0,
∂d

∗
∂αG
≥ 0.
∂d

Proposition 1 indicates that the information quality brings a tradeoff. If the information is
perfect (that is, when the separating-price-bidding equilibrium is the only sustainable
equilibrium), takeover always succeeds and we have the most efficient takeover outcome.
However, notice that the manager has an incentive to exert effort only when his effort
can influence the likelihood of takeover success. With perfect information, the manager’s
incentive to exert effort is completely eliminated (e∗ = 0), because the perfect information
completely severs this channel of influence.
In contrast to the perfect-information case, if the information is very noisy and the
manager’s private benefit is relatively small (i.e., when both m and d are low), the acquirer
will never bid the high price, which leads to the low-price-bidding equilibrium. This is
because a low m indicates that the manager’s incentive to work is low and, in addition, the
acquirer’s prior is low. With a low prior and a low-quality signal that is not precise enough
to sway her opinion, the acquirer will not offer the high price. In this case, the takeover
market has the strongest disciplinary role in the sense that only a low-value firm will be
taken over, and there is no negative impact on the manager’s effort. Because the acquirer
is discouraged from bidding the high price, the probability of a socially-efficient takeover
decreases. In this equilibrium, a higher information quality changes neither the manager’s
∗
∂α∗
= 0, ∂dG = 0.)
effort nor the acquirer’s bidding strategy (i.e., ∂e
∂d
While a low m indicates a low prior for the acquirer, the acquirer may occasionally offer
the high price upon a good signal when the signal is relatively more precise (mixed-pricebidding equilibrium). In this case, both the effort and the bidding strategy depend on
the information quality. In general, as the information quality increases, the acquirer is
less concerned about overbidding upon a good signal, and more likely to bid the high price
∂α∗
(i.e., ∂dG > 0), which leads to more efficient takeover outcomes. At the same time, since
the manager is more likely to lose his private benefit even though he works hard, higher
information quality negatively impacts the manager’s effort incentive and discourages the
∗
manager’s effort (i.e., ∂e
< 0).
∂d
Our analysis may provide some interesting insights into takeover markets. Some previous
studies have also shown that the takeover market is an effective corporate governance mech-
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anism to discipline the manager. However, such studies usually argue that the reason why
the takeover market can discipline managers is because acquirers are more likely to take over
firms with inefficient managers, and in such cases, the more precise the information about
the manager’s performance, the larger the disciplining effect. In contrast, our study shows a
different intuition; that is, the takeover market motives the manager to work hard (because
a low-value firm is taken over for sure), but only if the accounting signal is not perfect. If
the accounting signal is so accurate that takeovers almost always succeed, the manager loses
his incentive to exert effort because the takeover threat is disconnected from the manager’s
performance.

3.4

Optimal Information Quality

In this section we examine the optimal choices of information quality that maximize the
current shareholders’ payoff and the firm value, respectively. The firm value maximization
and the current shareholders’ expected payoff maximization are not fully aligned in the
presence of the takeover market. While both perspectives are broadly concerned about
the trade-off between managerial effort efficiency and takeover efficiency, the magnitude of
takeover efficiency differs: the current shareholders only gain a share of the synergy value
upon a successful takeover, whereas they also have the incentive to obtain an overbidding
premium from the acquirer. As a consequence, the optimal information quality to maximize
the firm value, denoted by d∗v , is different from the optimal quality that maximizes the current
shareholders’ payoff, denoted by d∗s . We will analyze both optimal information quality levels.
∗
∗
∗
∗
) to be the
, αB
) to be the expected firm value and Πs (e∗ , αG
, αB
We denote Πv (e∗ , αG
current shareholders’ expected payoff. The expected firm value is the current firm value
plus the expected total synergy value from a successful takeover. In contrast, the current
shareholders’ expected payoff consists of three parts: the current firm value, the expected
share of synergy value from a successful takeover, and the overbidding premium when the
acquirer offers a high price but the firm value is low. Formally, the expected firm value and
the current shareholders’ expected payoff are, respectively,
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
] + P rob(T |e∗ , αG
, αB
)v0 ,
, αB
) = E[v|e∗ , αG
, αB
Πv (e∗ , αG

(7)

∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
Πs (e∗ , αG
, αB
) = E[v|e∗ , αG
, αB
] + P rob(T |e∗ , αG
, αB
)(1 − γ)v0
∗
∗
+P rob(OT |e∗ , αG
, αB
) · 1.
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(8)

∗
∗
∗
In the payoff functions above, P rob(T |e∗ , αG
, αB
) = 1−e∗ +e∗ dαG
, which is the probabil∗
∗
ity of success given the equilibrium effort and bidding strategy. P rob(OT |e∗ , αG
, αB
) is the
probability of overbidding in successful takeover, which occurs only when a low-value firm
generates a good signal and receives a high bidding price. Substituting the equilibrium effort
and the bidding strategy into the above payoff functions, we can see that the information
quality affects the payoffs through each of the three components as stated in Lemma 3.
∗
∗
Lemma 3 Given the equilibrium e∗ , αG
, and αB
, increasing the information quality has the
following effects:
∗
∗
• it decreases the current firm value, E[v|e∗ , αG
, αB
];
∗
∗
• it increases the probability of takeover success, P rob(T |e∗ , αG
, αB
);
∗
∗
)
, αB
• it has a non-monotone effect on the probability of overbidding, with P rob(OT |e∗ , αG
2−m
0
maximized at d ≡ 2−m+mγv0 .

Increasing the information quality reduces the equilibrium effort, which means the firm
value is more likely to be low, and therefore the current firm value decreases as the information quality increases. The low current firm value leads to an overall increase in the takeover
success probability.
As for the impact on the probability of overbidding, there are two effects. Increasing
the information quality reduces the likelihood of misreporting a high signal for a low-value
firm, which directly reduces the probability of overbidding; however, the acquirer also bids
more aggressively as the information quality increases, therefore increasing the probability
of overbidding. The trade-off between these two effects leads to an interior level of d that
maximizes the overall probability of overbidding.
From Lemma 3, it is clear that the information quality affects the takeover efficiency and
current firm value in the exact opposite directions. We first consider the optimal information
quality choice for firm value maximization. The choice of optimal information quality that
maximizes the expected firm value depends on the trade-off between marginal effects on the
current firm value as determined by the manager’s effort and the expected synergy value
from successful takeovers.
1−m
Proposition 2 When the synergy value is small (v0 ≤ 21 ), we have d∗v ∈ [ 12 , 1−m+mγv
]; when
0
2v0 −m
1
∗
the synergy value is large (v0 > 2 ), we have dv = 2v0 −m+mγv0 .

14

The results in Proposition 2 suggest that the synergy value (v0 ) is the key determinant
of the optimal information quality to maximize the expected firm value. When the synergy
value is small, it is more important to motivate the incumbent manager to work hard to
improve the current firm value than to obtain the potential synergy value from a takeover,
and thus the optimal information quality remains low to mitigate the takeover threat to
the manager. On the other hand, when the synergy value is large, it is more important to
improve the takeover efficiency to realize the synergy value from a takeover, and thus it is
value-maximizing to have a higher information quality level in order to improve the chance
2v0 −m
1−m
> 1−m+mγv
).
of takeover success (notice that with v0 > 21 , we have d∗v = 2v0 −m+mγv
0
0
However, a perfect information system is never optimal for firm value maximization regardless of how large the synergy value. As previously mentioned, perfect information quality
completely destroys the manager’s effort incentive, and as a result, the current firm value
will always be low. Although with a perfect information system, the firm can fully realize
the synergy value as the takeover always succeeds, on the margin, changing information
quality has almost no effect on takeover efficiency when the information quality is close to
perfect. However, lowering the information quality to a less-than-perfect level has a strictly
positive effect on the manager’s effort and thus increases the total firm value. Therefore,
it is always worthwhile to lower the information quality to a less-than-perfect level for firm
value maximization.
For the current shareholders, the above trade-off also applies, but compared with the firm
value maximization, the impact of changing information quality on the current shareholders’
expected payoff differs in the following two aspects. First, the current shareholders only
receive partial benefit (1 − γ) from the synergy value after a successful takeover. Second, the
current shareholders receive an overbidding premium from the acquirer, which is a wealth
transfer from the acquirer (the future shareholder) to the current shareholders and not
part of the expected firm value. We have the following proposition regarding the optimal
information quality to maximize the shareholders’ payoff.
1−m
Proposition 3 When the synergy value is small (v0 ≤ 12 ), we have d∗s , d∗v ∈ [ 12 , 1−m+mγv
];
0
1
∗
∗
when the synergy value is large (v0 > 2 ), we have ds < dv < 1.

Similar to its role in firm value maximization, the synergy value is a key determinant
in the current shareholders’ optimal information quality choice. When the synergy value is
small (v0 ≤ 21 ), motivating the manager to increase the existing firm value is more critical,
and thus the shareholders choose the same low-range information quality level that sustains
the low-price-bidding equilibrium so that the takeover threat to the manager is minimized
15

1−m
(i.e., d∗s , d∗v ∈ [ 12 , 1−m+mγv
]). In this case, the current shareholders care more about the
0
managerial effort (and thus the current firm value) than either the potential synergy value
or the overbidding premium. In fact, in this equilibrium the shareholders do not enjoy the
overbidding premium.
When the synergy value is sufficiently large (v0 > 21 ), the information quality choice
for the current shareholders depends on the share of surplus that they may obtain from a
successful takeover and the manager’s private benefit. Since the current shareholders do not
enjoy the full benefit of the synergy value from a successful takeover, they lack the incentive to improve the information quality to the level of d∗v , as they care less about takeover
efficiency (i.e., d∗s < d∗v < 1). The impact on the overbidding premium from the information
quality choice, however, is not so obvious. On the one hand, higher information quality
increases the overbidding premium because it increases a good signal’s informativeness, and
thus the acquirer bids more aggressively upon a good signal. However, on the other hand,
higher information quality may reduce the expected overbidding premium, because the overall probability of observing the good signal for a low-value firm is reduced. The information
quality that maximizes the overbidding premium alone, d0 in Lemma 3, is higher than the
optimal information quality that maximizes the expected firm value (i.e., d0 > d∗v ). That
is, to capture more overbidding premium, the current shareholders would increase the information quality higher than the socially optimal level. However, once considering the impact
of information quality on both the synergy value and the overbidding premium, the current
shareholders are better off overall by choosing a lower level of information quality than d∗v ,
because the impact of the partial surplus from the synergy value dominates.

4

Antitakeover Laws

The takeover market can be influenced by antitakeover laws. The first generation of antitakeover laws started in the U.S. in 1968 with the Williams Act. In the mid-to-late 1980s and
1990s, many states introduced the second and third generations of antitakeover statutes with
even more stringent regulations on takeovers. Antitakeover laws primarily took three forms:
control-share-acquisition laws, fair-price laws, and business-combinations laws (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003; Cheng, Nagar, Rajan, 2004).12
12

Control-share-acquisition laws provide the holders of shares not held by the acquirer the right to decide
whether the acquirer’s shares have voting right in takeover. Fair-price laws require the acquirer to pay a fair
price for the shares for takeover purposes. The fair price is calculated using rules such as the maximum the
acquirer paid for shares acquired in the preceding two-year period. In essence, the fair-price laws impede a
takeover by forcing the acquirer to pay a high price for shares. Finally, business-combination laws prohibit
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In this section, we examine the impact of antitakeover laws on the optimal informationquality level that maximizes the current shareholders’ payoff. Moreover, we investigate the
effects of antitakeover laws on the expected firm value, taking into account the current
shareholders’ adjustment of optimal information quality in response to antitakeover laws.
Following prior studies such as Cheng et al. (2004), we treat the passage of antitakeover
laws as an exogenous shock to the corporate takeover market. We model the effect of
antitakeover laws by a decrease of the acquirer’s share of surplus from synergy value; i.e., γ
is lower after antitakeover laws are imposed. Antitakeover laws either weaken the acquirer’s
voting power thereby lowering her bargaining power (through control-share-acquisition laws),
or directly increase the offer price (through fair-price law), or reduce the potential divergence
of future firm value by the acquirer (through business-combination laws). All these effects
are consistent with a decrease in γ in our model.

4.1

Antitakeover Laws and Information Quality

We now examine the impact of antitakeover laws on the optimal information quality choice
for the current shareholders. Recall that our analysis in the last section shows cases in
which the optimal information quality is in the low range to sustain the low-price-bidding
1−m
]. In these cases, both the equilibrium effort (e∗ = m) and
equilibrium, d∗s ∈ [ 21 , 1−m+mγv
0
∗
∗
= 0) are insensitive to the information quality, as well as to the
, αB
bidding strategy (αG
share of synergy value, and thus the antitakeover laws do not play any active role. Therefore,
in this section we exclude these cases. We focus instead on cases in which antitakeover laws
have an impact, which happens in the following two scenarios when v0 > 21 :
• A1: when the acquirer’s share of synergy value is large and the manager’s private
benefit is also large, the optimal information quality is at the lower bound; i.e., d∗s = 12 .
• A2: when the acquirer’s share of synergy value is small, the optimal information
2v0 −m−mγv0
quality is an interior solution, d∗s = 2v
2 2.
0 −m+mγ v
0

Scenario A1 prevails when the acquirer’s share of synergy value, γ, is large, and the
manager’s private benefit, m, is also relatively large. As a result, the acquirer’s conjectured
effort level is high and she is more likely to offer a high price regardless of information quality
(the mixed-price equilibrium sustains). In this scenario, the current shareholders are more
the acquirer from specified transactions, such as sales of assets, mergers, and relational transactions, for a
number of years unless the board votes otherwise. Overall these antitakeover legislations make takeovers
more difficult and costly to acquirers with the aim of deterring takeovers (Romano, 1992).
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concerned about the negative effect on the effort from the acquirer’s aggressive bidding, and
optimally choose the lowest information quality, d∗s = 12 . That is, denote d∗∗
s to be the current
shareholders’ optimal choice of information quality after the passage of antitakeover laws.
1 13
∗
Thus, in scenario A1 we have d∗∗
s = ds = 2 .
Scenario A2 prevails when the acquirer’s share of synergy value, γ, is relatively small.
In this scenario the shareholders optimally choose an interior level of information quality
above the minimum level. After the passage of antitakeover laws, the acquirer’s share of
synergy value is reduced, and she bids less aggressively as the expected payoff from the
successful takeover becomes smaller. Consequently, the negative effect of increasing information quality on managerial effort is mitigated. Therefore, the current shareholders have
stronger incentives to increase the information quality after the passage of antitakeover laws
to encourage the acquirer to bid more aggressively. Moreover, the passage of antitakeover
laws also directly increases the shareholders’ share of synergy value, which gives them more
incentive to increase the information quality. Overall, the optimal information-quality level
1
∗
will increase after the passage of antitakeover laws, d∗∗
s > ds > 2 .
To summarize, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 After the passage of antitakeover laws, the current shareholders’ optimal
∗
information quality level weakly increases; i.e., d∗∗
s ≥ ds .
The results in Proposition 4 are consistent with the empirical evidence that financial
reporting quality improves after the adoption of antitakeover laws. Armstrong et al. (2012)
suggest that their finding of more informative financial statements after the passage of antitakeover laws is consistent with less private-information gathering in the equity market.
We provide an alternative explanation for the change of information environment. That is,
the current shareholders endogenously increase the information quality of financial reporting
in response to the passage of antitakeover laws. Our analysis focuses on the direct impact
of information on the takeover market, as well as the manager’s effort incentives with the
presence of a takeover threat.
13

As long as the antitakeover laws do not reduce the acquirer’s share of synergy value significantly, and the
manager’s private benefit is sufficiently large, the prevailing scenario does not change after the anti-takeover
laws. If the scenario changes after such laws, for example, if antitakeover laws reduce the acquirer’s share of
synergy from γ to γ 0 such that A1 holds with γ while A2 holds with γ 0 , we can consider it a combination
of A1 and A2. The result is still consistent with our overall conclusion in Proposition 4. Discussing all of
these possibilities does not add new insights into our results, and therefore we stick to the cases in which
each scenario still holds after the passage of antitakeover laws throughout the discussion.
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4.2

Economic Consequences of Antitakeover Laws

Taking into consideration that the current shareholders may adjust the information quality in
response to antitakeover laws, we now examine the consequences of such laws on managerial
effort, takeover efficiency, the current shareholders’ welfare, and firm value. We have the
following results regarding the antitakeover laws’ impacts.
Proposition 5 When the current shareholders are able to adjust the information quality
level, the adoption of antitakeover laws results in the following consequences:
• the current shareholders’ expected payoff always increases;
• in scenario A1, the manager’s effort increases, the probability of takeover decreases,
and the expected firm value’s decreases after antitakeover laws;
• in scenario A2, the manager’s effort decreases, the probability of takeover increases,
and the expected firm value increases after antitakeover laws.
The current shareholders’ payoff always increases after the passage of antitakeover laws,
because they now enjoy a larger share from synergy value through antitakeover protections.
The expected firm value, in contrast, may either increase or decrease depending on the
current shareholders’ adjustment of information quality in response to antitakeover laws.
In scenario A1, the current shareholders do not change the information quality after the
passage of antitakeover laws. With the adoption of such laws and the unchanged information
quality, the manager’s effort increases because the acquirer bids less aggressively. Although
the overall takeover efficiency nonetheless decreases since the acquirer bids less aggressively,
the firm value is more likely to be high, which in turn reduces the expected synergy value from
takeover. The expected total firm value is determined by a tradeoff between the decrease
in the expected synergy value because of a less efficient takeover and the increase in the
current firm value due to higher managerial effort. In this scenario, because the synergy
value is relatively large, the passage of antitakeover laws has a much larger negative effect
on the expected synergy value compared with the positive impact on the current firm value
through managerial effort. The expected total firm value therefore decreases after the passage
of antitakeover laws.
In scenario A2, since antitakeover laws increase the current shareholders’ share in synergy
value, the shareholders care more about the synergy value from a successful takeover than the
current fundamental firm value. Therefore the current shareholders optimally increase the
information quality to motivate more aggressive bidding by reducing the acquirer’s concern
19

for overbidding. As a result, the overall probability of takeover increases and the manager’s
effort decreases. Since the current shareholders choose a higher information quality level,
their choice is more aligned with firm value maximization, and therefore the expected total
firm value increases.
It is often argued that antitakeover laws deter takeovers, thereby insulating managers
from the takeover market and aggravating management entrenchment. Empirical studies, however, do not find strong evidence on the deterrence effect of antitakeover laws on
takeovers.14 Our results in Proposition 5 may provide a potential explanation for this empirical observation, as we find that the takeover frequency (efficiency) may either increase or
decrease, depending on the endogenous information quality choice after the passage of antitakeover laws. Some empirical evidences show that firms’ information quality increases and,
at the same time, overall takeover frequency increases upon the passage of antitakeover laws
(Armstrong et al., 2012; Comment and Schwert, 1995), which is consistent with our model’s
predictions of scenario A2. Furthermore, we also show that the acquirer’s bidding is more
aggressive when shareholders increase information quality after antitakeover laws, consistent
with the finding in Comment and Schwert (1995) that antitakeover laws are associated with
a significant increase in takeover premiums (i.e., the price paid above the target’s firm value).
Moreover, our analysis may offer some insight on the debate about whether antitakeover
legislation enhances or destroys shareholders’ welfare.15 It is interesting that our analysis
provides different implications from conventional wisdom in regards to antitakeover laws’
impact on firms’ welfare. Proponents of antitakeover laws usually argue that the laws protect
firms from detrimental hostile takeovers. However, in our model, takeovers can only enhance
firm value (for which the conventional wisdom suggests that anti-takeover laws reduce the
firm value), and we still find that antitakeover laws may increase the expected firm value. The
higher expected firm value is actually due to the fact that the current shareholders increase
the information quality in response to antitakeover laws to improve takeover efficiency.
Our results highlight the different impact of antitakeover laws on the the current shareholders’ payoff and the expected firm value. Moreover, the impact of antitakeover laws on
the expected firm value depends on the changes of the firm’s information environment in
response to the passage of such laws.
14

For example, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Bhagat and Jefferis (1993) find little evidence that
antitakeover defenses reduce takeover activities.
15
See Straska and Waller (2014) for a survey of studies in antitakeover legislations. Some argue that
antitakeover provisions result in losses because antitakeover provisions protect managers from the market’s
disciplining influence and impede valuable takeover enhancement. Others argue that antitakeover provisions
improve shareholders’ welfare despite the decrease of takeover probability, because shareholders may gain a
higher premium from more bargaining power in a takeover.

20

5

Extensions

5.1

Generalized Information Systems

In this section, we consider a more general assumption about the information system, allowing for different information quality levels for high- and low-value firms. We assume that
prob(y = B|v = 0) = d0 and prob(y = G|v = 1) = d1 , where d0 ∈ [ 12 , 1] and d1 ∈ [ 12 , 1]
can be different. With this general information structure, we can define the likelihood ratios
prob(B|v=1)
d1
1
and LB ≡ prob(B|v=0)
,
for a good signal and a bad signal as LG ≡ prob(G|v=1)
= 1−d
= 1−d
prob(G|v=0)
d0
0
respectively. An increase in the precision of signals (d0 or d1 ) increases the likelihood ratio
for a good signal, but decreases the likelihood ratio for a bad signal. We can characterize
the informativeness of the information system by the likelihood ratios. A more informative
system suggests a higher likelihood ratio for a good signal, LG , or a lower likelihood ratio
for a bad signal, LB . A perfectly informative system yields LG = ∞ and LB = 0.
For any conjectured effort level ê, the acquirer’s updated belief about a high firm value
B
G
and h(B) = êLBêL
. It is easy to see that
upon a signal can be written as h(G) = êLGêL
+(1−ê)
+(1−ê)
the acquirer’s belief depends on the likelihood ratios LG and LB , instead of on the individual
d0 or d1 . As in the main setup, in equilibrium the acquirer will never bid the high price upon
a bad signal, because it is not sustainable to support the conjectured effort level.
Among the sustainable equilibria, the acquirer may be willing to offer the high price
with some probability upon observing a good signal. When the likelihood ratio for a good
signal LG increases, the acquirer’s belief regarding high firm value also increases, and the
acquirer will bid more aggressively upon a good signal. As a result, the likelihood ratio for
a good signal LG directly affects the acquirer’s bidding strategy and the manager’s effort
in equilibrium. The basic intuition from our main analysis still holds here: increasing the
informativeness of the system (in terms of a higher likelihood ratio for a good signal) improves
the overall takeover efficiency, but discourages the manager’s effort. Similar to that in the
main setup, we can show that a perfect information system (LG = ∞) is not optimal for
either the current shareholders or the firm value maximization.
With the generalized information structure, the optimal levels of d0 and d1 that maximize
the current shareholders’ payoff or the firm value are not uniquely identified. Rather, we
find that the optimal information system only depends on the likelihood ratio upon the
good signal, LG . Specifically, there exists an optimal likelihood ratio L∗Gs that maximizes
the current shareholders’ payoff, and an optimal likelihood ratio L∗Gv that maximizes the
firm value.16
16

Proposition 6 shows the results when the optimal likelihood ratios have interior solutions. We may
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Proposition 6 The current shareholders’ payoff is maximized when the likelihood ratio satd∗
0 −m(1+γv0 )
isfies L∗Gs ≡ 1−d1s∗ = 2vmγv
, and the total firm value is maximized when the likelihood
0 (1+γv0 )
0s

ratio satisfies L∗Gv ≡

d∗1v
1−d∗0v

=

2v0 −m
.
mγv0

Moreover, L∗Gs < L∗Gv .

Proposition 6 is consistent with our main result that the current shareholders always
prefer a less informative information system than that of the firm value maximization. Notice
that our main model can be regarded as a special case of Proposition 6 in which the precisions
are restricted to be symmetric, d0 = d1 . Proposition 6 also shows that the precisions of signals
for the high- and low-value firms have mutual substitutional effects. For any given level of
d0 or d1 , we can always adjust the level of the other one such that the current shareholders’
payoff or the expected total firm value remains the same.
Moreover, we obtain a similar result regarding the effect of the passage of antitakeover
laws on the current shareholders’ choice of information system and the firm value maximization. As shown in Proposition 6, the optimal likelihood ratio L∗Gs decreases with the
acquirer’s share of the synergy value (γ). After the antitakeover laws, the acquirer’s bidding
is less aggressive due to a smaller share in synergy value. Therefore, the shareholders may
respond by endogenously increasing the informativeness of the system to encourage the ac∗
quirer’s bidding upon a good signal (i.e., L∗∗
Gs ≥ LGs ), and the firm value will increase when
the shareholders endogenously improve the informativeness.

5.2

Performance-Based Compensation Contract

In the main setting, we assume that the private benefit of control (m) is the only payoff that
the manager receives. Managers also typically receive performance-based compensations
in addition to the private benefit of control. From the corporate governance perspective,
manager compensation is an internal governance mechanism. The corporate takeover market
is considered an external governance mechanism that is often viewed as a “court of last resort”
and is applied when internal governance mechanisms are weak or ineffective (Jensen, 1988).
We now extend our model to incorporate a performance-based compensation contract.
For tractability, we consider a binary-effort model to illustrate the effect of the contracts.
We assume that the manager’s effort is binary, e ∈ {el , eh } and 0 ≤ el < eh < 1. Without loss
of generality, we assume el = 0. Similar to the main setting, the manager’s effort determines
the probability of high firm value, P rob(v = 1|e) = e. The cost of exerting low effort el
is zero, while the cost of exerting high effort eh is c, c > 0. We also assume that the cost
also have cases in which the optimal likelihood ratios are in a low range to sustain the low-price-bidding
equilibrium, but, in general, L∗Gs ≤ L∗Gv always holds.
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of exerting high effort is not prohibitively high, ech < 1, such that the current shareholders
prefer to motivate the manager’s high effort rather than low effort.
The manager’s effort is unobservable. At time 0, the current shareholders offer a compensation contract to the manager, w(y) ≥ 0, based on the observed public signal y. In a
risk-neutral, single-period model with limited liability, it is easy to show that the optimal
compensation contract takes the form w(G) = w and w(B) = 0, where w is the wage offered
when a good signal is observed.17 The compensation contract is public information, which is
a reasonable assumption given that public firms are now required to disclose their incentive
compensation packages.
With the compensation contract, the acquirer now conjectures the manager’s effort level
through the incentives provided by both the compensation contract and the manager’s private benefit. Upon a good signal, the acquirer bids either pgh = 1 + (1 − γ)v0 − w or
pgl = (1 − γ)v0 − w; upon a bad signal, the acquirer bids either pbh = 1 + (1 − γ)v0 or
pbl = (1 − γ)v0 . The offer upon a good signal excludes the compensation to be paid out to
the management. Given the offer price, the current shareholders in a low-value firm always
tender, and the current shareholders in a high-value firm tender only when a high price (pgh
or pbh ) is offered.
We follow a similar approach to that in our main setup to obtain the equilibrium efforts
and bidding strategies for any given information quality and compensation contracts. We
then examine how introducing the compensation contract affects the optimal information
quality levels for the current shareholders’ payoff and for firm value maximization. The
current shareholders can optimally choose both the information quality and compensation
contract to maximize their expected payoff. For firm value maximization, the optimal level
of information quality is determined when anticipating the compensation contract chosen by
shareholders.
In general, the key effects of information quality in our main setting are still present in
the setting with the compensation contract. Specifically, higher information quality improves
the takeover efficiency by moving the equilibrium to a more aggressive bidding equilibrium;
however, the manager’s effort is discouraged and, as a result, a higher level of compensation is
required to sustain the equilibrium. Compared with the main setting, the information quality
plays an additional role in determining the compensation contract efficiency: higher-quality
information leads to a more efficient compensation contract in motivating the manager’s
17

The reason is that, in equilibrium, both the manager’s effort and the acquirer’s bidding strategy depend
on the difference of two compensation schemes, w(G)−w(B). Therefore, the current shareholders can always
reduce w(B) to zero to maximize their expected payoff, yet maintain the manager’s effort and the acquirer’s
bidding strategy in the same equilibrium.
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effort. This additional role of information quality leads the optimal information quality to a
higher level. Our analysis shows the following findings.18
Remark 1 With a compensation contract,
• In general, the optimal information quality that maximizes the expected firm value
is perfect (d∗v = 1), but the current shareholders prefer a lower-than-perfect level of
information quality (d∗s ≤ 1).
• In addition, when the manager’s private benefit is sufficiently large, we have d∗s < 1,
and the optimal compensation contract to maximize the current shareholders’ payoff is
w∗ (d∗s ) = 0.
In our main setting, the manager is disciplined only through the external takeover market
due to the threat of losing his private benefit, which makes it hard to disentangle the effect of
information quality on the takeover efficiency from the effort efficiency. Therefore, a perfect
information system is never optimal. In this setting with a compensation contract, however,
the contract provides an alternative mechanism to motivate the manager’s effort, which is
independent from the takeover market. By increasing the information quality, both the effort
efficiency and the takeover efficiency can be improved and thus perfect information quality
in general is optimal for firm value maximization. When the information quality is perfect,
the compensation contract provides the full incentive to motivate the manager to choose
high effort.
However, for the current shareholders, they still prefer a lower-than-perfect information
quality level. As previously discussed, this is because the current shareholders’ objective
differs from the firm value maximization: namely, they do not enjoy the full benefit from
the takeover market, and they may obtain an overbidding premium. In addition, we find
that when the incentive provided by the private benefit of the manager is large enough, the
optimal compensation contract to maximize the current shareholders’ payoff becomes zero.
That is, the current shareholders do not need to use a compensation contract to motivate
the manager, and the takeover market becomes the only necessary governance mechanism
to discipline the manager in equilibrium. Our main setting can be viewed as the optimal
contracting result in this special case.
For the results in the Remark, we are able to prove analytically that d∗v = 1, d∗s < 1, and w∗ (d∗s ) = 0
when m is sufficiently large. For the case of small m, although we are unable to show the mathematical
proof due to a complicated multiple equilibria comparison, our numerical results are consistent with the
main conclusion. The analytical proof for Remark 1 is available upon request.
18
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Moreover, we obtain a similar result regarding the effect of the passage of antitakeover
laws. The optimal information quality for the current shareholders’ welfare weakly increases
∗
(i.e., d∗∗
s ≥ ds ), and both the current shareholders’ welfare and the expected firm value
weakly increase.

6

Conclusions and Empirical Implications

We develop a theoretical model to examine the interaction between the information quality of financial reporting and the takeover market as a corporate governance mechanism to
discipline managers. We find that perfect information quality is not optimal for the maximization of either the current shareholders’ expected payoff or the expected firm value. We
also highlight the difference between the current shareholders’ welfare and the firm value.
We show that the current shareholders’ choice of information quality level is lower than the
socially optimal level because the current shareholders do not enjoy the full synergy value
from the takeover. In addition, we examine the effect of antitakeover laws on the optimal
information quality choices and the expected firm value. We find that antitakeover laws may
increase the total firm value due to the increase of information quality after the passage of
antitakeover laws.
Our model provides theoretical explanations for some empirical findings regarding the role
of information quality in takeover markets. Our results are consistent with recent empirical
findings related to target firms’ information quality in takeovers. McNichols and Stubben
(2015) and Ramen et al. (2013) show that acquirers are able to bid more effectively and
pay less to acquire a target firm that has high-quality accounting information, which is
consistent with our theory’s predictions. In addition, our model prediction is consistent with
the empirical results in Armstrong et al. (2012) that firms increase information quality after
the adoption of antitakeover laws.
Our theoretical model also offers some new testable predictions for future empirical research in this area. For example, our analysis indicates that when a target firm’s potential
share in synergy value is small, the target shareholders would rather keep information quality
as low as possible. Moreover, after the passage of antitakeover laws, the firms with larger
shares in synergy value are more likely to respond to antitakeover laws and increase the
information quality. Hence, although information quality is an endogenous choice in our
model, the passage of antitakeover laws provides an exogenous shock to test our model’s
prediction regarding the impact of the relative share in the synergy value on the information
quality choice of the firms.
25

In addition, our results suggest that it is important to control the endogenous response
of firms when examining the impact of antitakeover laws on firm value. Empirical studies
often use the stock market response to antitakeover laws’ passage as a measure of a change
in the firm value. We predict a cross-sectional variation in stock market reaction among
firms that respond differently to the antitakeover laws in their information quality choice.
Our study takes the first step in analytically examining the interaction between financial
reporting’s information quality and takeover markets. The current model leaves plenty of
room for future studies. For example, in the current model we do not consider the conflict of
interest between the board and the shareholders, and we assume the board is benevolent and
makes decisions to maximize the current shareholders’ interest. Future studies can extend
our model and consider a case in which the board’s interest is not fully aligned with the
shareholders. In addition, in the current paper, we do not explicitly model the bargaining
over the synergy gains. Future research that can incorporate the endogenous bargaining
game between the parties will further enrich our understanding of takeover markets and
provide additional insight that our current model does not offer.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof. Lemma 1
We can rewrite
 Eq. (2) to be

if p < pl ;
 0,
Πr (p, ĥ) =
(1 − ĥ)(v0 − p),
if pl ≤ p < ph ;


(1 − ĥ)v0 + ĥ(1 + v0 ) − p, if p ≥ ph .
From this equation, Πr (p, ĥ) decreases with p when p ≥ ph or pl ≤ p < ph . As a result,
the optimal p that maximizes Πr (p, ĥ) will be either ph or pl , while all other prices are
dominated.
For pl = (1 − γ)v0 and ph = 1 + (1 − γ)v0 , we have Πr (pl , ĥ) = (1 − ĥ)γv0 and Πr (ph , ĥ) =
1
, with the equality holds
ĥ + γv0 − 1. That is, Πr (ph , ĥ) ≤ Πr (pl , ĥ) if and only if ĥ ≤ 1+γv
0
1
when ĥ = 1+γv
.
0
Without accounting signals, the acquirer’s belief about the probability of a high-value
1
realization is her conjectured effort level, ĥ = ê. Therefore, p∗ = ph when ê > 1+γv
, p ∗ = pl
0
1
1
when ê < 1+γv
, and the acquirer is indifferent between ph and pl when ê = 1+γv
.
0
0
Proof. Lemma 2
Upon observing the accounting signal, the acquirer’s belief becomes h(G) and h(B) as in
Eq. (3). It is easy to see that ĥ(G) ≥ ĥ(B). From the proof of Lemma 1, we have p∗ = ph
1
1
when ĥ(y) > 1+γv
, p∗ = pl when ĥ(y) < 1+γv
, and the acquirer is indifferent between ph
0
0
1
and pl when ĥ(y) = 1+γv
.
0
Given the equations in (3), we have the following results:
• When ê >
– If

1
2

1
:
1+γv0

≤d<

êγv0
,
1−ê(1−γv0 )

we have ĥ(G) > ĥ(B) >

1
.
1+γv0

As a result, αG = αB = 1.

êγv0
1
1
– If 1−ê(1−γv
≤ d ≤ 1, we have ĥ(G) > 1+γv
and ĥ(B) ≤ 1+γv
(the equality holds
0)
0
0
êγv0
êγv0
when d = 1−ê(1−γv0 ) ). Therefore, αG = 1; αB = 0 if 1−ê(1−γv0 ) < d ≤ 1 or αB can
êγv0
be any value in (0, 1) if d = 1−ê(1−γv
.
0)

• When ê <
– If

1
2

1
:
1+γv0

≤d<

1−ê
,
1−ê(1−γv0 )

we have ĥ(B) < ĥ(G) <

1
.
1+γv0

As a result, αG = αB = 0.

1−ê
1
1
– If 1−ê(1−γv
≤ d ≤ 1, we have ĥ(B) < 1+γv
and ĥ(G) ≥ 1+γv
(the equality holds
0)
0
0
1−ê
1−ê
when d = 1−ê(1−γv0 ) ). Therefore, αB = 0; αG = 1 if 1−ê(1−γv0 ) < d ≤ 1 or αG can
1−ê
be any value in (0, 1) if d = 1−ê(1−γv
.
0)
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• When ê =

1
:
1+γv0
1
1+γv0

– If d = 12 , we have ĥ(G) = ĥ(B) =
in (0, 1).
– If

1
2

< d ≤ 1, we have ĥ(G) >

1
1+γv0

. Therefore αG and αB can be any value

> ĥ(B) . Therefore, αG = 1 and αB = 0.

Therefore, we have the following results:
• When the information quality d is sufficiently low, the acquirer sticks to her default
bidding strategy.
• When the information quality d is sufficiently high, the acquirer revises her bidding
strategy in the following way:
- If ê >

1
,
1+γv0

then αG = 1, and αB = 0 or 0 < αB < 1.

- If ê <

1
,
1+γv0

then αG = 1 or 0 < αG < 1, and αB = 0.

- If ê =

1
,
1+γv0

then αG = 1 and αB = 0.

Proof. Sustainable Equilibria in Section 3.3
Given the acquirer’s bidding strategy (αG , αB ), the manager’s optimal effort that maximizes his expected payoff is derived in Eq. (6):
e∗ (αG , αB ) = m − m · [αG d + αB (1 − d)].
In the following, we solve for the equilibrium given the information quality d and the
manager’s private benefit m. We need to check that for the bidding strategies as shown in
Lemma 2, the manager’s optimal effort in response to the bidding strategies is consistent
with the conjectures.
(1). When the acquirer’s belief satisfies ê >

1
:
1 + γv0

êγv0
∗
∗
, then αG
(i) If 12 ≤ d < 1−ê(1−γv
= αB
= 1, which implies e∗ = 0 and it does not
0)
1
.
satisfy the conjecture ê > 1+γv
0
êγv0
∗
∗
(ii) If 1−ê(1−γv
< d ≤ 1, then αG
= 1, αB
= 0, which implies e∗ = m(1 − d). For any
0)
1
< d < 1 and 0 < m < 1, we have m(1 − d) < 12 . In addition, for 0 < v0 < 1 and
2
1
1
0 < γ < 1, we have 1+γv
> 12 . Therefore m(1 − d) < 1+γv
, contradicting with the
0
0
conjecture. Hence this equilibrium does not hold.
êγv0
∗
∗
∗
(iii) If d = 1−ê(1−γv
, αG
= 1 and αB
∈ (0, 1). Thus, e∗ = m(1 − d)(1 − αB
). Similar
0)
1
1
∗
to case (ii), it can be proved that m(1 − d)(1 − αB ) < 2 < 1+γv0 . As a result, this
equilibrium does not hold.

32

(2). When the acquirer’s belief satisfies 0 ≤ ê <

1
:
1+γv0

1−ê
∗
∗
(i) If 12 ≤ d < 1−ê(1−γv
, then αG
= αB
= 0. Thus, e∗ = m. This equilibrium sustains
0)
1−m
1
and 12 ≤ d < 1−m(1−γv
.
when m < 1+γv
0
0)
1−ê
1−ê(1−γv0 )
1−e∗
1−e∗ (1−γv0 )

(ii) If

∗
∗
< d ≤ 1, then αG
= 1, αB
= 0. Thus, e∗ = m(1 − d). We can prove

0 )+1−m)
that
= (1−d)(dm(1−γv
+ d > d, contradicting with the condition. The
1−(1−d)m(1−γv0 )
equilibrium does not hold.

(iii) If d =

1−ê
,
1−ê(1−γv0 )

∗
∗
∗
then 0 ≤ αG
≤ 1 and αB
= 0. Therefore, e∗ = m(1 − dαG
).

In equilibrium, ê = e∗ . Given that d =
∗
αG
=

1 γv0 dm−(1−d)(1−m)
d (1−d)m+γv0 dm

and e∗ =

1−ê
,
1−ê(1−γv0 )

∗
we then solve for αG
, which gives

1−d
.
1−d(1−γv0 )

∗
∗
Given that αG
needs to satisfy 0 ≤ αG
≤ 1, we have:

• When m >
∗
0 < αG
< 1.
• When m ≤

1
1+γv0

1
1+γv0

and

1
2

and d =

≤ d < 1, or m ≤
1−m
,
1−m(1−γv0 )

1
1+γv0

and

1−m
1−m(1−γv0 )

< d < 1,

∗
= 0.
αG

∗
∗
= 1. In equilibrium, e∗ = 0.
= 0 and αG
• When d = 1, we can derive αB

(3). When the acquirer’s belief is ê =

1
:
1 + γv0

∗
∗
= 0. The
= 1, αB
(i) If 12 < d ≤ 1, the acquirer’s optimal bidding strategy is αG
∗
manager’s best response is e = m(1 − d). However, it can be proved that m(1 − d) <
1
< 1 . As a result, the equilibrium does not hold.
2 1+γv0
∗
∗
∗
∗
are essentially
and αB
can be any value in [0,1]. Moreover, αG
and αB
(ii) If d = 12 , αG
the same, as the signal is completely uninformative. The manager’s optimal response
α∗ +α∗
is e∗ = m(1 − G 2 B ).
1
1
∗
∗
∗
The equilibrium exists when m ≥ 1+γv
and αG
+ αB
). αG
and
= 2(1 − m(1+γv
0
0)
∗
αB cannot be uniquely identified. However, in order to be consistent with the other
equilibrium, and to make the bidding strategy continuous, we assume that, in this case
1
0 dm−(1−d)(1−m)
∗
∗
∗
) (which can also be written as αG
= d1 γv(1−d)m+γv
αB
= 0 and αG
= 2(1 − m(1+γv
0)
0 dm
with d = 12 ).19

To summarize all sustainable equilibria previously discussed, we have three equilibria.
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
If we let αG
and αB
be any value as long as they satisfy αG
+ αB
= 2(1 − m(1+γv
), we can still show
0)
that the optimal payoff functions for shareholders and firm value remain the same as our current results. All
analyses will not be affected.
19
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∗
∗
• When d = 1, the manager chooses e∗ = 0 and the acquirer chooses αG
= 1, αB
= 0 in
the equilibrium.
1
1−m
• When m ≤ 1+γv
and 21 ≤ d ≤ 1−m(1−γv
(for our convenience in later proofs, we
0
0)
define this condition as C1), the manager chooses e∗ = m and the acquirer chooses
∗
∗
αG
= αB
= 0 in the equilibrium.
1−m
1
1
and 1−m(1−γv
and 12 ≤ d < 1 (for our
< d < 1, or m > 1+γv
• When m ≤ 1+γv
0
0)
0
1−d
and
convenience, we define this condition as C2), the manager chooses e∗ = 1−d(1−γv
0)
∗
the acquirer chooses αG
=

1 γv0 dm−(1−d)(1−m)
d (1−d)m+γv0 dm

∗
and αB
= 0 in the equilibrium.

Notice that C1, C2, and d = 1 are mutually exclusive conditions about m and d. A unique
sustainable equilibrium exists under each condition.
Proof. Proposition 1
The manager’s optimal effort is e∗ (αG , αB ) = m − m · [αG d + αB (1 − d)].
Given thesustainable equilibrium derived above, we can obtain that in equilibrium,

given d = 1;
 0,
e∗ (αy∗ ) =
m,
given C1;


1−d
, given C2.
1−d(1−γv0 )
(
γv
dm−(1−d)(1−m)
1 0
, given C2 or d = 1;
d (1−d)m+γv0 dm
∗
αG
=
0,
given C1.
(
γv0
− (1−d(1−γv
given C2 ;
∗
2 < 0,
0 ))
Therefore ∂e
=
and
∂d
0,
given C1 or d=1,

(1−m)γv0
1−m
)2 + 1−(1−γv )m
 (1−γv0 )[1−m(1−γv0 )](d− 1−(1−γv
0 )m
0
∂α∗G
> 0, given C2 or d=1;
2
2
2
m(d−d +γv0 d )
=
∂d
 0,
given C1.
Proof. Lemma 3
∗
∗
∗
∗
1) The expected current firm value E[v|e∗ , αG
, αB
] = e∗ (αy∗ ). Hence E[v|e∗ , αG
, αB
]
weakly decreases in d.
2) The probability of takeover success is,

given d = 1;

 1,
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗ ∗
∗
1 − m,
given C1;
P rob(T |e , αG , αB ) = 1 − e + e [αG d + αB (1 − d)] =


(1−d)2
1 − m(1−d(1−γv0 ))2 , given C2.
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 0,
=
0,



given d = 1;
We can prove that
given C1;
2(1−d)v0 γ
, given C2.
m(1−d(1−γv0 ))3
∗
∗
∗
Therefore, P rob(T |e , αG , αB ) weakly increases in d.
3) The probability of overbidding is,
(
0,
∗
∗
∗
∗
P rob(OT |e∗ , αG
, αB
) = (1−e∗ )[(1−d)αG
+dαB
] =
(1−d)v0 γ[dmv0 γ−(1−m)(1−d)]
d P rob(T |e∗ , α∗G , α∗B )
dd

given d = 1 or C1;
, given C2.
m(1−d(1−γv0 ))2
∗
∗
∗
We can prove that given C2, P rob(OT |e , αG , αB ) is concave and has a unique maximum
2−m
.
point at d = 2−m+mγv
0
Proof. Proposition 2
∗
∗
∗
∗
The expected firm value is Πv = E[v|e∗ , αG
, αB
] + P rob(T |e∗ , αG
, αB
)v0 . Substituting
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
E[v|e , αG , αB ] and P rob(T |e , αG , αB ) into Πv , we have
(
Πv =

m + (1 − m)v0 ,
1−d
v0 + 1−d(1−γv
−
0)

(1−d)2 v0
,
m(1−d(1−v0 γ))2

given C1;
given C2, or d = 1.

(9)

It is easy to show that Πv is continuous in both d and m. We consider two cases separately:
1
1
(i) when m ≤ 1+γv
, and (ii) when m > 1+γv
. In each case, the choice of information quality
0
0
d also affects which equilibrium holds. Therefore, we need to compare the payoffs in each
possible equilibrium and determine the optimal information quality for the expected firm
value.
(1). When m ≤

1
:
1+γv0

1−m
, C1 holds, and the expected firm value is m + (1 − m)v0 for
• If 12 ≤ d ≤ 1−(1−γv
0 )m
any information quality in this range.
1−m
• If 1−(1−γv
< d < 1, C2 holds. We need to solve a constrained optimization
0 )m
problem for Πv .

Taking the first-order derivative of Πv with respect to d, we have
dΠv
dd

=

v0 γ[(1−d)(2v0 −m)−dmv0 γ]
.
m(1−d(1−v0 γ))3

The first-order condition gives the unconstrained optimal-information quality level
2v0 −m
in this equilibrium, denoted as dv ≡ 2v0 −m+mγv
. We verify that the second-order
0
condition holds.
Next, we need to check whether the interior solution exists for the optimization
v
problem. Notice that dΠ
< 0 at d = 1. Therefore, d = 1 is never optimal for firm
dd
value maximization.
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1−m
– If 21 < v0 < 1, dv satisfies 1−(1−γv
< dv < 1. The optimal information
0 )m
2v
−m
0
.
quality maximizes Πv , d∗v = dv ≡ 2v0 −m+mγv
0
1
1−m
, we can prove that dv ≤ 1−(1−γv
.
– If v0 ≤ 12 , combined with m ≤ 1+γv
0
0 )m
1−m
Notice that Πv is continuous at d = 1−(1−γv0 )m . Therefore, the optimal infor1−m
mation quality maximizes Πv , d∗v ∈ [ 12 , 1−(1−γv
].
0 )m

(2). When m >

1
:
1+γv0

With the assumption m < v0 , we can prove that m >
√

1
1+γv0

holds only when v0 >

4γ+1−1
(> 12 ).
2γ

For any 12 ≤ d < 1, C2 holds. We have the same unconstrained maximum point dv
that maximizes Πv . We can prove that 12 < dv < 1. In addition, Πv is continuous at
2v0 −m
v
d = 1 and dΠ
< 0 at d = 1. As a result, d∗v = dv ≡ 2v0 −m+mγv
.
dd
0
(
2v0 −m
d∗v = 2v0 −m+mγv
,
if v0 > 21 ,
0
Combining (1) and (2), we conclude that
1−m
d∗v ∈ [ 12 , 1−(1−γv
], if v0 ≤ 21 .
0 )m
Proof. Proposition 3
The expected payoff for the current shareholders is
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
).
, αB
)(1 − γ)v0 + P rob(OT |e∗ , αG
, αB
] + P rob(T |e∗ , αG
, αB
Πs = E[v|e∗ , αG
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
Substituting E[v|e , αG , αB ], P rob(T |e , αG , αB ) and P rob(OT |e , αG , αB ) into Πs , we
have
(
Πs =

m + (1 − m)(1 − γ)v0 ,

given C1,

m[1−d(1−γv0 )][1+v0 −d(1+v0 −v02 γ(1−γ))]−(1−d)2 v0
,
m(1−d(1−v0 γ))2

given C2, or d = 1.

It’s easy to prove that Πs is continuous in both d and m.
Under the condition C2, we solve the constrained optimization problem for Πs . Taks
ing the first-order derivative of Πs with respect to d, we have dΠ
= 0 when d = ds ≡
dd
2v0 −m(1+γv0 )
. We verify that the second-order condition holds.
2v0 −m(1−γ 2 v02 )
s
Notice that dΠ
< 0 at d = 1. Therefore, d = 1 is never optimal for the current
dd
shareholders.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we consider all possible cases for the values of m, v0 ,
and γ. In each case, the choice of information quality d also affects which equilibrium holds.
We need to compare the payoffs in each possible equilibrium and determine the optimal
information quality for the expected firm value. In each case that we consider below, if C1
holds, then Πs = m + (1 − m)(1 − γ)v0 for any information quality in this range. If C2
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holds, we then need to check whether the the unconstrained maximum point ds is an interior
solution.
1
Given the assumption m < v0 , we can prove that v0 > 1+γv
if and only if v0 >
0
√
4γ+1−1
(> 12 ).
2γ

Therefore we consider the following cases:
√

• When 0 < v0 ≤

4γ+1−1
,
2γ

– If 0 < γ ≤ 2 −

then m < v0 implies m <

√
2 and

1
2−γ

√

< v0 ≤

1
.
1+γv0

4γ+1−1
,
2γ

1−m
< ds < 1.
1−(1−γv0 )m
2v0 −m(1+γv0 )
ds ≡ 2v0 −m(1−γ 2 v2 ) . We
0

ds satisfies

The optimal information quality maximizes Πs is d∗s =
1
then compare d∗s with d∗v . Because 2−γ
> 12 , the optimal information quality that
2v0 −m
. We can prove that d∗s < d∗v .
maximizes firm value is d∗v = dv ≡ 2v0 −m+mγv
0
√
√
√
1
– If 0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2 and 0 < v0 ≤ 2−γ
, or 2 − 2 < γ < 1 and 0 < v0 ≤ 4γ+1−1
,
2γ
1−m
the unconstrained optimal information quality ds ≤ 1−(1−γv0 )m . Therefore, the
1−m
optimal information quality maximizes Πs is d∗s ∈ [ 21 , 1−(1−γv
]. Under this
0 )m
1
1−m
1
1
∗
∗
condition, if v0 ≤ 2 , then ds , dv ∈ [ 2 , 1−(1−γv0 )m ]; if v0 > 2 , it is then easy to
1−m
show that d∗s ∈ [ 21 , 1−(1−γv
] < d∗v = dv .
0 )m
√

1
• When 4γ+1−1
< v0 < 1 and m < 1+γv
, the case is similar to the one above. We need
2γ
0
1−m
to compare the interior solution ds with 1−(1−γv
for the optimization problem of the
0 )m
√

shareholder. Because

4γ+1−1
2γ

> 12 , in this case d∗v = dv .

√
√
√
1
– If 0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2 and 4γ+1−1
< v0 < 1, or 2 − 2 < γ < 1 and 2−γ
< v0 < 1,
2γ
1−m
< ds < 1. The optimal information quality maximizes Πs
ds satisfies 1−(1−γv
0 )m
2v0 −m(1+γv0 )
is d∗s = ds ≡ 2v
2 2 .
0 −m(1−γ v0 )
√
√
1
1−m
– If 2 − 2 < γ < 1 and 4γ+1−1
< v0 < 2−γ
, we can prove ds ≤ 1−(1−γv
.
2γ
0 )m
1
1−m
Therefore, the optimal information quality maximizes Πs is d∗s ∈ [ 2 , 1−(1−γv0 )m ].

In both cases, d∗s < d∗v .
√

• When

4γ+1−1
2γ

< v0 < 1 and v0 > m >

1
,
1+γv0

C2 holds. In this case d∗v = dv .

We have the same unconstrained maximum point ds that maximizes Πs . By checking
whether the interior solution exists for the optimization problem, we have:
√
√ √
1
– If (i) 0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2, 4γ+1−1
or (ii)
< v0 < 2−1
and v0 > m > 1+γv
2γ
γ
0
√
√
√
2v0
1
0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2, 2−1
< v0 < 1 and 1+γv
< m < (1+γv
2 < γ < 1,
2 , or (iii) 2 −
γ
0
0)
2v0
1
1
1
< v0 < 1 and 1+γv0 < m < (1+γv0 )2 , ds satisfies 2 < ds < 1. The optimal
2−γ
information quality maximizes Πs , d∗s = ds ≡
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2v0 −m(1+γv0 )
.
2v0 −m(1−γ 2 v02 )

√
– If (i) 0 < γ ≤ 2− 2,

√
< m < v0 or (ii) 2− 2 < γ < 1,
√
√
4γ+1−1
2v0
1
1
<
v
<
1
and
<
m
<
v
,
or
(iii)2
−
2
<
γ
<
1,
< v0 < 2−γ
,
0
0
2−γ
(1+γv0 )2
2γ
1
1
and v0 > m > 1+γv0 , then ds < 2 . The optimal information quality maximizes
Πs , d∗s = 12 .
√

2−1
γ

< v0 < 1 and

2v0
(1+γv0 )2

In both cases, d∗s < d∗v .
To summarize the above discussions, we have the following:
1−m
when v0 ≤ 21 , d∗s , d∗v ∈ [ 12 , 1−(1−γv
]; when v0 > 12 , d∗s < d∗v < 1.
0 )m
Proof. Proposition 4
From the proof of Proposition 3 we can obtain the following three scenarios:
√
√
1
, and m < v0 , or (ii) 2 − 2 < γ < 1,
• Scenario 1: when (i) 0 < γ ≤2 − 2, 0 < v0 ≤ 2−γ
√
√
√
4γ+1−1
1
,
and
m
<
v
,
or
(iii)
2
−
< v0 ≤ 2−γ
, and
0 < v0 ≤ 4γ+1−1
2
<
γ
<
1,
0
2γ
2γ
1
1
1
1
m ≤ 1+γv0 . (i)-(iii) can be rewritten as: 2 < v0 < 1, 2 − v0 < γ < 1, 0 < m < 1+γv
,
0
1
1
1−m
and 0 < m < v0 ; or 0 < v0 < 2 and 0 < m < v0 . In this case, d∗s ∈ [ 2 , 1−(1−γv0 )m ]. The
1−m
is decreasing
upper bound of the range of the optimal information quality 1−(1−γv
0 )m
in γ.
√ √
2v0
• Scenario 2 (A1): when (i) 0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2, 2−1
< v0 < 1 and (1+γv
2 < m < v0 , or
γ
0) √
√
2v0
1
(ii) 2 − 2 < γ < 1, 2−γ < v0 < 1 and (1+γv0 )2 < m < v0 , or (iii)2 − 2 < γ < 1,
√

4γ+1−1
2γ
1
1, 1+γv
0

1
1
< v0 < 2−γ
, and 1+γv
< m < v0 . (i)-(iii) can be rewritten as:
0
1
< m < v0 , and 2 < v0 < 1. In this case, d∗s = 12 .

√

√
2v0 − m
√
v0 m

<γ<

√
√
1
< v0 < 2−1
and m < v0 or (ii)
• Scenario 3 (A2): when (i) 0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2, 2−γ
γ
√
√ √2−1
2v0
0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2, γ < v0 < 1 and 0 < m < (1+γv0 )2 , or (iii) 2 − 2 < γ < 1,
1
< v0 < 1
2−γ
1
<m<
1+γv0

√

√

2v0 − m
2v0
√
and 0 < m < (1+γv
and
2 . (i)-(iii) can be rewritten as: 0 < γ <
v0 m
0)
1
1
1
v0 , or 0 < γ < 2 − v0 and 0 < m < 1+γv0 , and 2 < v0 < 1, 0 < m < v0 .

2v0 −m(1+γv0 )
In this case, d∗s = ds ≡ 2v
2 2 . Furthermore, the interior optimal information
0 −m(1−γ v0 )
∗
quality ds is decreasing in γ.
0

Let γ and γ be the acquirer’s shares of synergy value before and after the adoption of
0
anti-takeover laws, respectively, and 0 < γ < γ < 1. We then consider how the adoption of
antitakeover laws affects the conditions for each scenario to hold. If the scenario still holds, it
is clear from the above results, that antitakeover laws then increase the optimal information
quality. If the scenario does not hold, we need to find a new scenario and compare it with
the old scenario.
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• If scenario 1 holds initially, then the optimal information quality after antitakeover
laws either remains in the same range, or jumps to scenario 3 when γ decreases to γ 0 .
√
1
For example, suppose initially 0 < γ ≤2 − 2, 12 < v0 ≤ 2−γ
, and m < v0 holds. If γ 0
0
1
is not too small such that 12 < v0 ≤ 2−γ
0 remains, then scenario 1 still holds with γ .
1
If γ 0 is small enough such that 2−γ
0 < v0 , then scenario 1 does not hold, but scenario
3 holds. We can show a similar result for all of the conditions under scenario 1 and
∗
prove that d∗∗
s ≥ ds .
• If scenario 2 holds initially, then either scenario 2 remains, or scenario 1 or scenario
√
3 holds as γ decreases to γ 0 . For example, suppose initially (i) 0 < γ ≤ 2 − 2,
√
0
2v0
2−1
< v0 < 1 and (1+γv
If γ becomes very small such that
2 < m < v0 holds.
γ
0)
√

2v0
v0 < 2−1
or m < (1+γ
0 v )2 , then scenario 3 holds. In the same way, we can show that
γ0
0
√
√
2v0
1
when (ii) 2 − 2 < γ < 1, 2−γ
< v0 < 1 and (1+γv
<
m
<
v
,
or
(iii)2
−
2 < γ < 1,
0
2
0)
√

4γ+1−1
2γ

1
1
< v0 < 2−γ
, and v0 > m > 1+γv
initially holds, then after the anti-takeover
0
law, either scenario 2 remains, or scenario 1 or scenario 3 holds. Again, we have
∗
d∗∗
s ≥ ds .

• If scenario 3 holds initially, then the condition in scenario 3 is relaxed as γ decreased to
γ 0 . Therefore, scenario 3 still holds after the anti-takeover law. From the above result,
∗
the interior solution is decreasing in γ, therefore we have d∗∗
s > ds .

Proof. Proposition 5
We focus on the cases of A1 and A2, where condition C2 holds. In the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3, we have derived the shareholder’s expected payoff and the expected firm value
given d and γ as
m[1−d(1−γv0 )][1+v0 −d(1+v0 −v02 γ(1−γ))]−(1−d)2 v0
Πs (d, γ) =
,
m(1−d(1−v0 γ))2
2

(1−d) v0
1−d
Πv (d, γ) = v0 + 1−d(1−γv
− m(1−d(1−v
2.
0)
0 γ))
Recall that the manager’s equilibrium effort is e∗ (d) =
(1−d)2

1−d
,
1−d(1−γv0 )

and the probability of

takeover is P T ∗ (d) = 1 − m(1−d(1−γv0 ))2 .
We denote e∗ (and e∗∗ ) and P T ∗ (and P T ∗∗ ) to be the manager’s equilibrium effort and
the probability of takeover before (and after) the passage of antitakeover laws given the
optimal information quality levels, d∗s and d∗∗
s .
For simplicity, we assume after the antitakeover laws, the prevailing scenario does not
change. If the scenario changes after the antitakeover laws, for example, if A1 holds with γ
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while A2 holds with γ 0 after the adoption of antitakeover laws, we can then consider it as a
combination of A1 and A2, and show that our results remain.
1
∗
∗∗
• Under A1, d∗s = d∗∗
s = 2 . Substitute ds and ds into Πs (d, γ) and Πv (d, γ), we obtain
that

Π∗s (γ) = 1 + v0 −
Π∗v (γ) = v0 −

v0
m(1+v0 γ)2

v0
m(1+v0 γ)2

+

− v0 γ;

1
.
1+γv0

Taking the first-order derivatives, we have
v0 (2v0 −mγv0 −m)
m(1+v0 γ)3

∂Π∗s
∂γ

= v0



2v0
m(1+v0 γ)3


− 1 < 0, and

∂Π∗v
∂γ

=

> 0.
0

0

As a result, we have Π∗s (γ) < Πs ∗ (γ ) and Π∗v (γ) > Πv ∗ (γ ).
1
∗
∗
∗
∗∗
Substituting d∗s and d∗∗
= 1+γ10 v ;
s into e (d) and P T (d) , we obtain e = 1+γv0 , and e
0
1
1
∗∗
∗∗
∗
P T ∗ = 1 − m(1+γv
and
P
T
=
1
−
.
It
is
obvious
that
e
>
e
and
0
2
m(1+γ v0 )2
0)
P T ∗∗ < P T ∗ .
2v0 −m−mγv0
∗∗
• Under A2, we have d∗s = 2v
2 2 , ds =
0 −m+mγ v0
Πs (d, γ) and Πv (d, γ), we obtain that,

Π∗s (γ) =

4v02 (1−γ)+m(1+γv0 )2
,
4v0

Π∗v (γ) =

m
4v0

+ v0 −

0

2v0 −m−mγ v0
.
2v0 −m+mγ 0 2 v02

Substituting d∗s and d∗∗
s into

mv0 γ 2
.
4
∗

s
Taking the first-order derivatives, we have ∂Π
= 12 (m − 2v0 + mv0 γ) < 0, and
∂γ
0
0
− 12 mv0 γ < 0. As a result, we have Π∗s (γ) < Π∗s (γ ) and Π∗v (γ) < Π∗v (γ ).

∗
∗
∗
Substituting d∗s and d∗∗
s into e (d) and P T (d) , we obtain e =
0

m(1+γ v0 )
; PT∗
2v0
∗∗

and P T

= 1−
> P T ∗.

m(1+γv0 )2
4v02

and P T ∗∗ = 1 −

0

m(1+γ v0 )2
.
4v02

m(1+γv0 )
2v0

∂Π∗v
∂γ

=

and e∗∗ =

It is obvious that e∗∗ < e∗

Combining all the cases, we get Proposition 5.
Proof. Proposition 6
Under the generalized information system, and analogous to the equilibrium in the main
1
setting, denoting h0 ≡ 1+γv
, we can derive the equilibrium as follows:
0
h0 (1−m)
m(1−h0 )
mLB (LG −1)
LG −LB

• (separating-price-bidding equilibrium) When LG ≥
LG h0
,
h0 (1−m)+mLG (2h0 +(1−h0 )LG −1)
∗
∗
chooses αG = 1, αB = 0.

the manager chooses e∗ =

and 1 ≥ LB ≥
and the acquirer

0 (1−m)
• (low-price-bidding equilibrium) When LG < hm(1−h
(Condition C1’), the manager
0)
∗
∗
∗
chooses e = m and the acquirer chooses αG = 0, αB = 0.
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• (mixed-price-bidding equilibrium) When LG ≥

h0 (1−m)
m(1−h0 )

and

LG h0
(Condition C2’), the manager’s effort
h0 (1−m)+mLG (2h0 +(1−h0 )LG −1)
−LB )(mh0 +mLG (1−h0 )−h0 )
h0
∗
∗
. The acquirer chooses αG = (LGm(1−L
, αB
= 0.
h0 +LG (1−h0 )
B )LG ((1−h0 )LG +h0 )

0 < LB <

is e∗ =

The shareholder’s expected payoff is
∗ LG −1
∗ LG (1−LB )
)(1 − γ)v0 + (1 − e∗ )αG
.
Πs (LG , LB ) = e∗ + (1 − e∗ + e∗ αG
LG −LB
LG −LB
∗
∗
∗ ∗ LG (1−LB )
The expected firm value is Πv (LG , LB ) = e + (1 − e + e αG LG −LB )v0 .
∗
∗
When the separating-price-bidding equilibrium sustains, we substitute αG
= 1, αB
=0
mL
(L
−1)
and e∗ = LBG −LGB into Πs (LG , LB ) and solve for the optimal LG and LB . We find that
the optimal level of likelihood ratios for the current shareholders under the separating-price2−m
Gs h0
and LBs = h0 (1−m)+mLGsL(2h
.
bidding equilibrium is a corner solution: LGs = mγv
0
0 +(1−h0 )LGs −1)
Notice that this optimal corner solution in the separating-price-bidding equilibrium also approaches the conditions for the mixed-price-bidding equilibrium. Therefore, the separatingprice-bidding equilibrium is weakly dominated by the mixed-price-bidding equilibrium. Similarly, we can also prove that the separating-price-bidding equilibrium is a dominated equilibrium for the firm value maximization as well.
∗
∗
When the low-price-bidding equilibrium sustains, αG
= 0, αB
= 0 and e∗ = m. Both the
shareholder’s expected payoff and the expected firm value are independent of the information
system as long as the condition for sustaining the low-price-bidding equilibrium sustains
0 (1−m)
LG < hm(1−h
. We do not include this case in the proposition, but even with this case, in
0)
general we still have L∗Gs ≤ L∗Gv .
When the mixed-price-bidding equilibrium is the optimal equilibrium, substituting e∗ =
−LB )(mh0 +mLG (1−h0 )−h0 )
h0
∗
∗
= (LGm(1−L
= 0 into Πs (LG , LB ) and Πv (LG , LB ),
, αG
, and αB
h0 +LG (1−h0 )
B )LG ((1−h0 )LG +h0 )
we obtain that Πs (LG , LB ) and Πv (LG , LB ) are independent of LB . Taking the first-order
derivative with respect to LG , we then obtain the optimal likelihood ratios L∗Gs and L∗Gv that
0 −m(1+γv0 )
0 −m
satisfy the first-order conditions: L∗Gs = 2vmγv
and L∗Gv = 2vmγv
. The second-order
0 (1+γv0 )
0
conditions hold. It is easy to show that L∗Gs < L∗Gv .
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